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Who plays roulette in a casino? Since the expected return to playing is negative, the 
obvious answer would appear to be risk lovers. But this is not necessarily the case. Thus, a risk 
averse consumer may decide to set aside a given sum as a conceptual “entrance fee”, enter the 
casino (where there is no entrance fee) and play with his entrance money either until he loses it all 
or until he decides to leave with money left over or even a profit, whichever occurs first. It has 
even been suggested by Mobilia (1993)
 2, using a rational addiction framework, that such risk 
averse gamblers may even be addicted. Since Mobilia’s model does not involve any explicit 
considerations of risk, we do not deal with the addiction issue here. In this paper, we present an 
empirical framework for determining whether or not  customers at the roulette wheel are risk 
averse or risk loving.  
We proceed as follows. In section 1, we present a summary of the Aumann-Serrano risk 
index (Aumann and Serrano (2007), hereafter [AS]), as generalized to allow for the presence of 
risk lovers by Schnytzer and Westreich (2010) (hereafter [SW]). We show that, for any gamble, 
whereas riskiness increases for gambles with positive expected return as the amount placed on a 
given gamble is increased, the opposite is the case for gambles with negative expected return. 
Since roulette involves binary gambles, we restrict our attention to such gambles exclusively and 
derive empirically testable hypotheses in section 2. In particular, we show that, all other things 
being equal, for gambles with a negative expected return, riskiness decreases as the size of the 
contingent payout increases. On the other hand, riskiness increases if the gamble has a positive 
expected  return.  We  also  prove  that,  for  positive  return  gambles,  riskiness  increases,  ceteris 
paribus,  in  the  variance  of  the  gamble  while  the  reverse  is  true  for  gambles  with  negative 
expected  returns.  In  section  3,  we  apply  these  results  to  the  specific  gambles  involved  in 
American roulette and discuss how we might distinguish between casino visitors who are risk 
averse and those who are risk loving as well as those who may suffer from gambling addictions 
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2  The model is based on Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy (1988).  For other applications, see Chaloupka (1988, 1990a, 1990b) and 
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of one form or another. 
  
 
1  The Generalized Aumann and Serrano Index of Riskiness 
 
Following  [AS]  and  [SW]  we  outline  the  notion  of  a  generalized  index  of  inherent 
riskiness, with no a priori assumptions about attitudes toward risk. A utility function is a strictly 
monotonic  twice  continuously  differentiable  function  u   defined  over  the  entire  line.  We 
normalize u so that  
  (0)=0 and (0)=1 uu     
     
If u is concave then an agent with a utility function u is risk averse, while if u is convex, then 
an agent with a utility function u is risk lover. 
 
The following definition is due to Arrow (1965 and 1971) and Pratt (1964):  
 
Definition 1.1 The coefficient of absolute risk of an agent i  with utility function  i u  and wealth 
w  is given by:  
  ) ( )/ ( = ) , ( = ) ( w u w u u w w i i i i i        
 
 Note  ) (x ui  is concave in a neighborhood of  w if and only if  0, > ) (w i   while if it is 
convex if and only if  0. < ) (w i   
 
Definition 1.2  Call i  at least risk averse or no more risk loving than  j  (written  j i ) if for all 
levels  i w  and  j w  of wealth,  j  accepts at  j w  any gamble that i  accepts at  . i w  Call i  more risk 
averse or less risk loving than  j  (written  ) j i  if  j i  and  . i j
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We have:  
 
Corollary 1.3 Given agents i  and  , j  then  
  ( ) ( ) i i j j i j w w  
for all  i w  and  . j w   
  
Definition 1.4  An agent is said to have Constant Absolute Risk (CAR) utility function if his 
normalized utility function  ) (x u  is given by  
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If  0 >   then the agent is risk-averse with a CARA utility function, while if  0 <   then the 
agent is risk-loving with a CARL - Constant Absolute Risk-Loving - utility function . If  0 =   
then the agent is risk neutral. The notion of ``CAR'' is justified since for any  ,   the coefficient of 
absolute  risk     defined  in  Def.1.1,  satisfies    = ) (w   for  all  , w   that  is,  the  Arrow-Pratt 
coefficient is a constant that does not depend on  . w   
 
Proposition 1.5  An agent i  has CAR utility function if and only if for any gamble  g  and any 
two wealth levels, i  either accepts  g  at both wealth levels, or rejects  g  at both wealth levels.   
 
The next theorem appears in [SW] extending the original idea of [AS]. It verifies the 
existence of the general index for the following class of gambles. A gamble g is gameable if it 
results in possible losses and possible gains. If g has a continuous distribution function, then it is 
gameable if it is bounded from above and below, that is, its distribution function is truncated.     
 




    
 Then for any wealth, a person with utility function   u  is indifferent between taking and not 
taking  . g  In other words, the CAR utility function   u  satisfies for all  , x   
  ). ( = ) ( x u x g Eu     
Moreover,  is positive (negative) if and only if Eg is positive (resp. negative).   
 
Definition 1.7  Given a gamble  , g  denote the number   obtained in Th.1.6 by the upper limit of 
taking  . g   
 
The notation upper limit is justified by the following:  
 
Theorem 1.8 Let   be the upper limit of taking a gamble  . g  Then: 
1. If  0 > Eg  then all CARL accept  g  and a CARA person with a utility function   u  accepts  g  
if and only if  
    < < 0  
 2. If  0 < Eg  then all CARA reject  g  and a CARL person with a utility function   u  accepts  g  if 
and only if  
  0 < <   




We propose here the following general index of inherent riskiness. Given a gamble g and 
its upper limit α define its index Q(g) by: 
  
  ( ) = Q g e
 
       
              
Th. 1.8 and the fact that Q is a monotonic decreasing function of α, imply that: 
 
Corollary 1.9 An increase in riskiness corresponds to a decrease in the set of constant risk-
attitude agents that will accept the gamble.  
 
Caution: The corollary above does not say that constant risk-attitude agents prefer less risky 
gambles. It says that they are more likely to accept them.  
 
 It is straightforward to check the following properties: 
  
Corollary 1.10  The generalized index  ) (g Q  given in (6) satisfies: 
1.  0 > ) (g Q  for all  . g  
2.  If  0 > Eg   then  1 < ) (g Q   and  if  0 < Eg   then  1. > ) (g Q   When  0 = Eg   then 
1. = ) (g Q  
3.  . ) ( = ) (
1/N g Q Ng Q  In particular  
 
1 ) ( = ) (




Remark 1.11 Unlike the case of the [AS]- index, homogeneity of degree 1 does not hold. 
However, when  0 > ) (g E  then it is replaced by (increasing) monotonicity. This follows since in 
this case  ( )<1, Qg  hence if  1 < t  then  ), ( < )) ( ( = ) (
1/ g Q q Q tg Q
t  while if  1 > t  then 
). ( > )) ( (
1/ g Q q Q
t  This is no longer true for gambles with negative positive return.  If  0 < ) (g E  
then  ( ) 1 Qg    and Q is monotonically decreasing with respect to multiplication by t. This 
follows by the same argument as above, with the reverse inequalities.  
 
Put simply, the remark says that, for a risk averse person, the greater the stake the riskier 
the gamble, whereas for a risk lover the more money invested in a particular gamble, the less the 
risk! Following Cor. 1.9, consider the suggested index of riskiness as the opposite to the number 
of constant risk attitude gamblers who will accept it. Now, the intuition for the risk averse person 
is straight-forward: placing more money in situation of risk is undesirable since the marginal 
utility of money is falling and this kind of individual wants to sleep at night. So, as the amount at 
stake rises, the riskiness rises and there are fewer constant risk attitude risk averse gamblers who 
will accept it.  
For the risk lover, on the other hand, the marginal utility of money is rising. Thus, the 
more money he stands to win, ceteris paribus, the better of he is. Besides which, the risk lover  
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gets  utility  from  the  adrenalin  rush  that  accompanies  gambling.  Accordingly,  as  the  amount 
waged on a given gamble increases, there will be more constant risk attitude risk loving gamblers 






2  Binary Gambles 
 
In  this  section  we  further  turn  to  a  discussion  of  specific  properties  of  the  index  of 
inherent risk as it applies to binary gambles. For this case, we prove that our index is a monotonic 
function of Var(g), which is increasing for gambles with Eg>0 and decreasing otherwise.   
 
Let g be a gamble that results in a gain of M with probability  p  and a loss of  L  with probability 
. 1 = p q   We assume M  and L  are positive real numbers.  Note that: 
 
22 ( ) ( ) (1 )( ) (1) Eg p M L L g p p M L         
 
In  order  to  generate  the  empirically  testable  hypotheses  discussed  in  the  next  section,  we 
summarize partial relations between expected utilities, expectations of gambles, chances to win 
and riskiness. We start with expected utilities of Constant Absolute Risk (CAR) utility functions. 
Consider  ( ) ( , , ) Eu g Eu L M Eg  as a function of the independent variables L, M and Eg. 
 
Proposition 2.1  Assume  g  results in a gain of M with probability p and a loss of L  otherwise.  
Let 
1 ( ) (1 ), 0,
x u x e

 
    be a CAR utility function. Then: 
  0    implies  0
Eu
M  
and  0    implies  > 0.
Eu
M   
 
 
Proof.  By (1) we have 







.                                                                                           
Hence 
11 ( ) (1 (1 ) ) (1 ( ) )
M L M L L Eg L
Eu g pe p e e e e
ML
    
 
    
       
            
 












We claim that 
() ( ) 1 ( )
LM f L M e  is negative for all  0.    Indeed, 
 
( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) ( )(1 )
L M L M f L M L M e L M e
 
         
If  0    then  '( ) 0 f    while if  0    then  '( ) 0. f    Since (0) '(0) 0 ff  , our claim 
follows. Since  ( ) ( ) Eu g f    multiplied by a positive value, the desired result follows.   QED 
 
We consider now how Q = Q(g) is related to the other variables .  Following Th.1.6 we need to 
solve  1 0.
g Ee
    That is:  
  0 = 1
ML pe qe
    
The following is quite intuitive.  
 
Proposition 2.2  Let  g  be a gamble that results in a gain M  with probability  p  and a loss L 
otherwise. Consider Q(g) as a function of the independent variables L, M and Eg. Then we have: 


























Proof.  Assume  12 . MM   Let  1 g  be the gamble resulting in  1 M and  2 g  resulting in  2. M  Let 
1   satisfies  0. = ) ( 1 1 g Eu  By Th.1.8, if  0 < Eg  then  0 < 1   and since  12 MM  it follows by 
Prop. 2.1 that  12 11 ( ) ( ). Eu g Eu g    Hence an agent with utility function 
1 u  accepts  . 2 g  This 
implies by Th.1.8 that  , < 2 1    where  0 < 2   is the upper limit of taking  . 2 g  Since Q=e
-α we 
have  12 ( ) ( ) Q g Q g   and we are done. When  0 > Eg  then by  1 0,   and by Prop. 2.1, 
12 11 0 ( ) ( ). Eu g Eu g  
 
Hence  1   rejects  2 g  and thus  21 <   and  12 ( ) ( ). Q g Q g   If 
0 = Eg then Q(g) = 1 and the result follows.       QED 
 
For binary gambles, fixing Eg and increasing M, means increasing Vg=Var(g). Thus Prop.2.2 
























     
we have by Proposition 2.1 and 2.2 that:  





















             
 
   3  Roulette  
              
       The casino game of roulette is probably the simplest practical example of the inherent risk 
index. In this case, every possible bet is a binary gamble where the return to a losing bet is always 
the outlay and both the probability of success and the concomitant payout are known. There is 
thus no uncertainty here, merely risk. Accordingly, roulette also provides the simplest case for a 
study of attitudes towards risk of casino gamblers. In the absence of data, we are restricted to 
proving some potentially interesting empirically testable hypotheses. We hope to be able to test 
these when/if data are forthcoming. 
 








 Table I provides complete details for the different kinds of bets available in the American version 
of the game
4.  









(on a $1 bet) = Eg 
0  0  35 to 1  37 to 1  −$0.053 
00  00  35 to 1  37 to 1  −$0.053 
Straight up  Any single number  35 to 1  37 to 1  −$0.053 
Row 00  0, 00  17 to 1  18 to 1  −$0.053 
Split  any two adjoining numbers vertical or horizontal  17 to 1  18 to 1  −$0.053 
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 In the European version, the setup of the wheel is slightly different.   
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Trio  0, 1, 2 or 00, 2, 3  11 to 1  11.667 to 1  −$0.053 
Street  any three numbers horizontal  11 to 1  11.667 to 1  −$0.053 
Corner  any four adjoining numbers in a block  8 to 1  8.5 to 1  −$0.053 
Six Line  any six numbers from two horizontal rows  5 to 1  5.33 to 1  −$0.053 
1st Column  1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053 
2nd Column  2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053 
3rd Column  3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053 
1st Dozen  1 through 12  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053 
2nd Dozen  13 through 24  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053 
3rd Dozen  25 through 36  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053 
Odd  1, 3, 5, ..., 35  1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053 
Even  2, 4, 6, ..., 36  1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053 
Red 
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 30, 
32, 34, 36 
1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053 
Black 
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 
13, 15, 17, 20, 22, 24, 
26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35 
1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053 
1 to 18  1, 2, 3, ..., 18  1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053 
19 to 36  19, 20, 21, ..., 36  1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053 
Five 
Number 
0, 00, 1, 2, 3  6 to 1  6.6 to 1  −$0.079 
 
The initial bet is returned in addition to the mentioned payout. Note also that 0 and 00 are neither odd nor 
even in this game. 
 
 The crucial questions are:  what kinds of gamblers play roulette and can we determine their 
attitudes to risk based on the kinds of bets they place? Are they all risk-lovers? Or perhaps some 
of them are people who pay a certain amount of money for fun, this being the amount they are 
willing to lose when gambling and which they view as an “entrance fee” or some such and then 
bet as risk-averse gamblers so that any losing bets provide zero utility while winning bets provide 
positive utility?  
 
Indeed, according to the rational addiction model of Mobilia (1993), as farfetched as it may seem 
when simple intuition is applied, there may even be risk averse gamblers who are addicted! Thus, 
a rational risk averse gambler who obtains utility from the act of gambling (as he might from 
smoking  a  cigarette)  may  be  shown  to  be  rationally  addicted  if  the  quantity  of  gambling 
demanded  today  is  a  function  of  gambling  in  the  future.  But  this  requires  the  very  strange 
assumption that such a gambler obtains actual (as distinct from positive expected) utility from 
even losing gambles. Finally, it should be stressed that attitude towards risk nowhere comes into 
the  Mobilia  model.  On  the  other  hand,  her  utility  function  adopted  permits  a  far  wider 
interpretation than our own.  
 
Be all of this as it may, it seems clear that in principle there may be both risk lovers and risk 




5. Now, since our utility functions are static, we can shed no light on addiction but 
we can generate some testable hypotheses regarding attitudes to risk. 
 
The two different points of view yield different ways of calculating the index of riskiness. We can 
either assume that each gamble yields a possible loss of 1 and a possible gain of M. In this case 
only risk lovers bet. We will denote this gamble by g 1  and  calculate  Q1  according  to  these 
assumptions. 
         
To allow for risk averse players, let’s assume that the gambler is ready to pay $0.5 for the fun (his 
entrance fee). Let now g2 be the gamble where one can either lose 0.5$ or win M+0.5. From table 




Let Q2 be the corresponding index of risk. Note that the two indexes are different, and by the 
previous section, one is a monotonic decreasing function of M and the other is increasing.  
 
We suggest that data on bets can shed light on gambler type. If most gamblers are risk averse who 
willingly spend some money on gambling for fun, they will choose the smaller M. If they are 
“big” risk lovers they will choose the greater M, but if they are “small” risk lovers they can 
choose other gambles. 
   
                                        
5  We are unaware of any formal model explaining gambling addiction for risk lovers, but there seems no reason to rule out such a 
possibility a priori.   
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Table II: Two possible calculations for the Risk Index (Q)  
  
Bet name Payout = M  Q1(g)  Q2(g) 
0  35 to 1  1.003065  0.959765 
00  35 to 1  1.003065  0.959765 
Straight up  35 to 1  1.003065  0.959765 
Row 00  17 to 1  1.006318  0.919738 
Split  17 to 1  1.006318  0.919738 
Trio  11 to 1  1.00978  0.880007 
Street  11 to 1  1.00978  0.880007 
Corner  8 to 1  1.013457  0.840812 
Six Line  5 to 1  1.02138  0.805094 
1st Column  2 to 1  1.05467  0.76214 
2nd Column  2 to 1  1.05467  0.76214 
3rd Column  2 to 1  1.05467  0.76214 
1st Dozen  2 to 1  1.05467  0.76214 
2nd Dozen  2 to 1  1.05467  0.76214 
3rd Dozen  2 to 1  1.05467  0.76214 
Odd  1 to 1  1.111  0.538585 
Even  1 to 1  1.111  0.538585 
Red  1 to 1  1.111  0.538585 
Black  1 to 1  1.111  0.538585 
1 to 18  1 to 1  1.111  0.538585 
19 to 36  1 to 1  1.111  0.538585 
Five Number  6 to 1  1.027295  0.33569 
 
Comments: 
1. We have by Prop. 2.2, that
()




. This is demonstrated in the table in the 
column of Q1.  The case when Eg > 0 is demonstrated in Q2.  
 
2. Based upon these observations, we would predict that if most players are “big” risk-lovers then 
more roulette players choose to play 35 to 1 gambles and fewest would chooses even money 
gambles. Unfortunately, we have no data that would permit us to test this hypothesis formally, but 
we have been told that the following holds in casinos operated by HIT in Slovenia and elsewhere 
in Southern Europe.
6 First, less than 5 percent of all gamblers play 2 to 1 or even money gambles. 
Second, in most instances there are multiple bets on one spin of the wheel.  Thus, most of the 
gamblers choose 17 to 1 or 35 to 1 gambles, but most of the customers will cover, with such bets, 
approximately 12 of the available numbers (out of 37) on one roule tte spin. Finally, following 
                                        
6
This information was provided by Igor Rus of HIT.  
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winning bets, gamblers will proceed to cover more numbers in a subsequent bet. There is no 
observable trend following losing bets. 
 
Note that by Prop. 2.1, CAR agents will aleays choose the extreme options, risk lovers will 
choose the maximal M, while risk averse will choose the minimal. This is not always true, as can 
be seen in the following example. 
 
Example:  Assume an agent with a utility function u(x) = -x
2 +100x for x < 50.  This is a concave 
utility function in this domain.  Consider the following gambles: 
g1  yields loss of 0.5  with probability 0.5 and gain of 1.5 with probability 0.5. Eg1 = 0.5 and 
Eu(g1) = 51.25. 
g2 yields loss of 0.5 with probability 0.9 and gain of 19.5 with probability 0.1. Eg2 = 0.5 as well 
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